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Abstract
The concepts of complementarity and entanglement are considered with
respect to their significance in and beyond physics. A formally generalized,
weak version of quantum theory, more general than ordinary quantum theory
of material systems, is outlined and tentatively applied to some examples.
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1 Introduction
Complementarity and entanglement are notions which have become popular through
the signicance they received in quantum theory. Nevertheless they were and are
applied in other elds, even beyond physics, as well. There are cases in which their
purely physical meaning is naturally extended, in other cases they are used in ways
making the connnection to physics hard, inscrutable, or even impossible.
A signicant advantage of a formal denition of those terms, as it is charac-
teristic for their use in physics, is the rigor and precision which can be achieved
by mathematical reasoning. For non-physical applications, such reasoning becomes
increasingly dicult, and a formal approach, if it is possible at all, must be much
more general (less specic) than in physical contexts.
In this contribution we propose a formal way to dene the concepts of comple-
mentarity and entanglement in a manner allowing a stepwise relaxation of restricting
conditions needed for their denition in the context of quantum physics. The main
purpose of this approach is to sketch possibilities for applying the two notions in a
less restricted, but equally precise way. In particular, the intended areas of possible
application are beyond the scope of physics. In other words, the attempt is to gen-
eralize the mathematical and conceptual framework of physical quantum theory in
such a way that the generalized, weak version of the theory is still mathematically
formulated, but no longer restricted to physics in its traditional scope.
To be a bit more explicit, complementarity will be extended beyond the concept
of non-commuting properties of a quantum system such as momentum and position
as elements of a C*-algebra. Entanglement, which is tightly related to comple-
mentarity, will similarly be extended beyond the concept of (generally) non-local
correlations (not interactions) between non-commuting properties of quantum sys-
tems. In particular, a formal framework will be outlined that might facilitate using
the concepts of complementarity and entanglement in situations exceeding the lim-
its of physics as a science of the material world. For instance, the signicance of
complementarity and entanglement could be explored in philosophical, psychologi-
cal or psychophysical problem areas, without loosing the desirable formal rigor and
precision. In this context, the question is which features of physical quantum theory
must be relaxed if one wants to apply weak versions of quantum theory to those
problem areas.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In Sec. 2, we give some se-
lected examples for complementarity and entanglement for physical, psychological,
philosophical, and psychophysical situations. Sec. 3 provides a compact overview
concerning the formal and conceptual framework of quantum theory. We use an
algebraic point of view since the algebraic formulation is best suited for a clear and
transparent discussion of conceptual issues. Moreover it is abstract enough to open
the possibility that it can be applied beyond the physical domain. In Sec. 4, a weak
version of quantum theory, neutral with respect to its application in a specic scien-
tic eld, will be presented. Conditions will be outlined under which weak quantum
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theory can be stepwise restricted in order to recover the ordinary quantum theory
used in physics. Sec. 5 will indicate tentative applications, not yet worked out in
nal detail, of the weak version. The idea is to look for the concrete signicance of
general features of weak quantum theory in selected examples.
2 Complementarity and entanglement:
some examples
Complementarity is a concept made popular by Bohr in his attempts to highlight
crucial features of quantum theory. The textbooks by Meyer-Abich (1965), Murdoch
(1987), and Pais (1991) provide a lot of details. A special issue of the journal
\Dialectica", edited by Pauli (1948), contains articles on complementarity by leading
physicists, including Bohr himself (Bohr 1948).
>From a conceptual point of view, Bohr used the concept of complementarity to
indicate a relationship between apparently opposing, contradictory notions which
can be characterized in terms of a relationship of polarity. Complementary features
typically exclude each other, but at the same time complement each other mutually
to give a complete view of the phenomenon under study. This is nicely demonstrated
by the design Bohr once selected for a medal with which he was honored: it shows the
text \contraria sunt complementa", accompanied by the Chinese Yin-Yang symbol.
The various examples which Bohr discussed as complementary over the years are
of dierent signicance and status. To study the corresponding dierences in detail,
it is necessary to look somewhat closer at various \complementary" pairs of notions.
In particular, it is worthwhile to explore which ones among them are denitely
related to entanglement, which ones are denitely not related to entanglement, and
which ones are (presently) not understood well enough to draw this distinction
clearly.
The best formalized examples of complementary pairs of notions are those re-
ferring to pairs of non-commutative properties of a system, so-called observables.
Well-known examples are position Q and momentum P (with a generally continu-
ous spectrum) or spins in dierent directions (with only two discrete eigenvalues).
The fact that, for instance, P and Q do not commute is formally expressed as a
Heisenberg type commutation relation
[P, Q] = PQ−QP = i~1l, (1)
where ~ is the Planck action h divided by 2pi. For more details see, e.g., Jammer
(1974) and references given there.
The non-commutativity or incompatibility of observables is at the heart of the
non-Boolean structure of quantum theory, and as such it is a major precondition
for situations in which states of systems are entangled. Entanglement characterizes
the fact that a system in a pure state in general cannot be simply decomposed into
subsystems with pure states. In a certain sense, such subsystems do not exist a priori
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but must be generated by appropriate procedures. This has conceptual consequences
rst pointed out by Einstein et al. (1935); the term entanglement itself was coined
by Schro¨dinger (1935).
The theoretical arguments (Bell 1964) and experimental results (Aspect et al.
1982) which, beyond any reasonable doubt, conrmed the entangled (holistic) char-
acteristics of quantum systems were based on spin-1/2 systems, i.e. spin measure-
ments on photons. The crucial empirical feature in this context are so-called nonlocal
(holistic) correlations between two photons. Popular misconceptions notwithstand-
ing, it is illegitimate to interpret these correlations due to causal interactions between
the photons.
In particular situations, the relationship between energy and time can also be
considered as complementary in the sense of non-commutative observables. Al-
though traditional quantum theory was not general enough to enable a formal incor-
poration of corresponding observables, later developments have shown that energy
and time (and related observables) can be rigorously treated as non-commutative
in a more general framework. Major progress in this respect has been achieved in
the theory of stochastic and ergodic systems (Tjstheim 1976, Gustafson and Misra
(1976), Misra (1978).
If observables are non-commutative, this implies uncertainty relations (such as
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations) between them. For position and momentum,
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation reads:
pq  ~/2 (2)
The meaning of this relation is that a quantum system cannot be in a state in
which both P and Q have dispersion-free (denite) expectation values. The primary
signicance of relation (2) is thus of ontic character and goes beyond epistemic
problems of measurement errors or computation errors.
The existence of an uncertainty relation does not necessarily imply that it orig-
inates from non-commutative observables. There are classical observables whose
uncertainty relations are simply due to Fourier reciprocity. For instance, engineers
have known for long that the classical bandwidth ω (energy) and the classical
duration t (time) of a signal satisfy an uncertainty relation
ωt  1/2 (3)
which is not restricted to ordinary quantum systems and does therefore not imply
ordinary quantum entanglement.
In addition to non-commutative properties of physical systems, it is also pos-
sible to formalize particular kinds of descriptions of physical systems in a non-
commutative manner. For instance, one can show that a description of the tem-
poral evolution of a system in terms of a Liouville operator L and an information
theoretical description of the same system in terms of an information operator M
are complementary in the sense that
[L, M ] = LM −ML = iK1l (4)
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where K is the (dynamical) Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy of the system (Atmanspacher
and Scheingraber 1987).
Such a complementarity of dynamical descriptions is a special case within the
broader class of deterministic versus statistical descriptions, whose distinction can
be related to that of ontic versus epistemic descriptions (Scheibe 1973, Primas 1990).
In contrast to corresponding formalized kinds of complementarity, there are other
pairs of descriptions whose \complementarity" is not formally backed up to a com-
parable degree. A historical example in quantum physics is the relationship between
wave-oriented and particle-oriented descriptions. Furthermore, beyond the limits of
physics, there are complementarities of substance and form, of allopoietic and au-
topoietic systems, of statistical and deterministic descriptions, of ecient and nal
causation, and many others. For all of them, it would be as dicult as interesting
to show whether they are related to some kind of entanglement.
Leaving the natural sciences, things become even more complicated, and formal
approaches are, at least at present, totally lacking. Nevertheless, e.g., the cognitive
sciences and psychology oer a multitude of examples which might refer to com-
plementarity. The relationship between conscious and unconscious processes (Jung
1971, Pauli 1954), between Jung’s psychological types (thinking and feeling, intu-
ition and sensation; Jung 1921), between substantive and transitive mental states
(James 1950), between bi- or multistable states of perception (Plaum 1992, Kruse
and Stadler 1995) and between multiple personalities (Jordan 1947) are all candi-
dates for complementary relations which call for more detailed investigation.
Bohr considered the concept of complementarity as so fundamental and widely
applicable that he even used it to characterize philosophical or philosophy-related
problems (cf. Bernays 1948). Three often quoted examples refer to the denition
versus the usage of terms, clarity versus truth, and goodness versus justice. The
complementary pair of conrmation and novelty has been proposed for a suitable def-
inition of meaning in terms of pragmatic information (Weizsa¨cker 1974, Kornwachs
and Lucadou 1985). Probably one of the most far-reaching applications of comple-
mentarity, however, concerns the relation between mind and matter or, respectively,
between mental and material observables of systems.
One crucial problem area in this respect is the relationship between the psycho-
logical experience of mental activity and the (neuro-)physiological brain processes
without which such experience does (most likely) not exist (cf. Chalmers 1996). This
example shows in a particularly clear manner how problematic it is to prematurely
interpret such relationships in terms of causality. The basic concept for a comple-
mentary relationship between mind and matter is that of correlations, i.e., \neural
correlates of consciousness", between the considered notions. The question whether
there are causal interactions on top of these correlations is, of course, important.
However, assigning causality too quickly can lead to ill-posed questions. It is illus-
trative to consider many features of the debate between adherents of \mind over
matter" versus those of \matter over mind" from this point of view.
Another, even more speculative, approach to the relationship between mind and
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matter was put forward by Jung and Pauli (1952). Inspired by the old philosophical
concept of psychophysical parallelism, such as in Leibniz’s philosophy, Jung and
Pauli explored the idea of a complementary relationship between mind and matter
in a very broad sense. An essential aspect of their speculations was a reality behind
(or beyond) those two realms which is, e.g. for epistemological purposes, split into a
mental and a material domain. This split (sometimes called Cartesian cut) destroys
the primordial wholeness of the background reality, and \synchronistic" correlations
between mind and matter remain as remnants of the lost wholeness. Such a scenario
is obviously inspired by the quantum theoretical conception of entanglement (see,
e.g., Atmanspacher and Primas 1996, Walach and Ro¨mer 2000, Atmanspacher 2001).
Concrete and detailed indications concerning the substance of such a scenario are,
at least to our knowledge, not available so far.
In view of all these examples, the question arises whether it is possible to general-
ize the standard quantum theoretical framework in such a way that complementarity
and entanglement might be useful concepts in a broader context. Moreover, since
the two concepts are not identical with each other, it is worthwhile to formally
explore the conditions which particular situations must satisfy to allow us to talk
about complementarity and entanglement. For this purpose, the next section gives
a brief outline of the essential formal and conceptual features of standard quantum
theory from an algebraic perspective. Subsequently, it will be studied which of those
features can be relaxed without losing the structures necessary for complementarity
and entanglement.
3 Algebraic quantum theory in a nutshell
The algebraic formulation of quantum theory is the most appropriate framework for
discussing its formal and conceptual structure and possible generalizations. In this
section, we give a brief overview of algebraic quantum theory in order to provide
a solid foundation for the following sections. More comprehensive and detailed
accounts can be found in standard textbooks and monographs, such as Haag (1996),
Piron (1976), Primas (1983), or Thirring (1981).
The fundamental notions for the description of a quantum system  are those
of observables and states. An observable is any property of the system  which can
{ at least in principle { be measured in a reproducible way. To every observable
A belongs a set specA  C of complex numbers, the set of possible results of a
measurement of A. The observables of  generate a C∗-algebra A which is called
the observable algebra of . The system  can be in dierent physical states, and a
physical state z determines the probability distributions for the measured values of
any observable A. In quantum theory, states are positive linear functionals on A.
Let us explain these notions in more detail. First of all, the observable C∗-
algebra A is an algebra over the complex numbers C, which means that addition
and multiplication of elements in A as well as multiplication with complex numbers
6
are dened such that for A, B, C 2 A, α, β 2 C:
A1 A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C
A2 There is a zero element 0 with 0 + A = A + 0 = 0.
A3 To every A there is an opposite element −A such that A+(−A) = A−A = 0.
A4 A + B = B + A
A5 1  A = A
A6 α(βA) = (αβ)A
A7 (α + β)A = αA + βA
A8 α(A + B) = αA + αB
A9 A(BC) = (AB)C
A10 There is a neutral element 1l 2 A with 1lA = A1l = A.
A11 (αA)B = A(αB) = αAB
A12 A(B + C) = AB + AC, (B + C)A = BA + CA
Moreover, A is a star-algebra, i.e., there is an involution A 7! A∗ with:
S1 (αA + βB)∗ = αA∗ + βB∗ (α is the complex conjugate of α 2 C)
S2 (AB)∗ = B∗A∗
S3 (A∗)∗ = A
A is also a Banach star-algebra, which means that there is a norm function A 7!
jjAjj 2 R with
B1 jjAjj  0, jjAjj = 0 , A = 0, jjαAjj = jαj jjAjj
B2 jjA + Bjj  jjAjj+ jjBjj
B3 jjABjj  jjAjj jjBjj
B4 jjA∗jj = jjAjj
B5 A is complete with respect to the norm jj  jj, i.e., every sequence An with
jjAm − Anjj < ε for m, n  N(ε) converges to a (unique) element of A.
Finally, the so-called C∗-condition for A means:
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C1 jjA∗Ajj = jjAjj2 (B4 follows from C1)
A state z is a (continuous real) functional A 7! z(A) 2 C on A with:
Z1 z(αA + βB) = αz(A) + βz(B), z(A∗) = z(A)
Z2 z(A∗A)  0
The reader will notice that we also admit an \impossible" zero state z = 0. The
set of all states is convex, hence with z1 and z2 also
z = αz1 + (1− α)z2, 0  α  1 (5)
is a state. A state z is called pure, if it does not admit a non-trivial decomposition
of type (5). Pure states contain maximal information about the system .





Ez(A) is the mean of measured values of A in the state z, if the (reproducible)
measurement of A is repeated many times in the same state z.
In quantum theory, specA, the set of possible measured values of A is given by
those α 2 C, for which (A − α1l) has no inverse in A. Moreover, only self-adjoint
elements of A are normally admitted as observables:
A∗ = A; (7)
The uncertainty σzA of a self-adjoint observable A 2 A in a state z 6= 0 is dened
as
(σzA)
2 = Ez((A−Ez(A))2) = Ez(A2)− Ez(A)2  0. (8)






j Ez(AB −BA) j. (9)
In quantum theory, as opposed to classical theory, the observable algebra is not
commutative. This means that, in general, AB − BA 6= 0, and there is no state in
which all uncertainties vanish. Commuting observables with AB = BA are called
compatible, non-commuting observables with AB 6= BA are called incompatible or
complementary.
Propositions are special observables, whose measured values can only be \yes"
=̂ 1 or \no" =̂ 0. They are given by elements P 2 A with
P ∗ = P, P 2 = P. (10)
For z 6= 0, Ez(P ) is the probability that P is measured as \yes" in the state z.
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To every proposition P we can associate a negation P = 1l− P with
Ez(P ) = 1− Ez(P ). (11)
The conjunction of two propositions P1 and P2 is given by the proposition




and the adjunction is dened as
P1 _ P2 = 1l− (1l− P1) ^ (1l− P2) = P 1 ^ P 2. (13)
We nd
P1,2(P1 ^ P2) = (P1 ^ P2)P1,2 = P1 ^ P2,
P1,2(P1 _ P2) = (P1 _ P2)P1,2 = P1,2. (14)
For compatible P1, P2 we simply have
P1 ^ P2 = P1P2
P1 _ P2 = P1 + P2 − P1P2 (15)
The spectral theorem states that every self-adjoint observable A can be equiva-
lently represented as the adjunction of propositions which are mutually compatible
and compatible with A.
In the usual formulation of quantum theory, observables are operators and states
are density matrices on a Hilbert space H. In the (more general) algebraic formu-
lation, such Hilbert space formulations can be recovered by the so-called GNS-
construction.
Every state z 6= 0 denes a vanishing ideal
Iz = fC 2 A j z(C∗C) = 0g. (16)
The quotient algebra A/Iz, together with the scalar product
< [A], [B] >z= z(A
∗B) (17)
on the equivalence classes [A] = A + Iz, [B] = B + Iz, then gives rise to a Hilbert
space Hz and to a representation
A[B] = [AB] (18)
of A on Hz.
For what follows it is important that every observable A 2 A acts on the set Z








ρA1A2(z) = ρA1ρA2(z). (21)
We can identify A and ρA up to a complex phase, which is generically xed,
if specA is known. The action of observables on states corresponds to the active
interpretation of observables as operations changing the state of a system. For a









Application of P corresponds to verication of P . One remarkable feature of
quantum theory is its holistic character. If a quantum system  is composed of two
subsystems 1 and 2, then the state of  is in general not determined by the states
of 1 and 2. The reason for this resides in the non-commutativity of the algebra
A of . A contains subalgebras A1 and A2 refering to the subsystems 1 and 2. If
1 and 2 are well-separated, A1 will commute with A2. Nevertheless, there will be
observables A 2 A of the total system which are incompatible with observables in A1
and/orA2. Intimately related to this, there exist entangled states of the total system,
in which the values of observables in A1 and A2 are undetermined but correlated
without any interaction between 1 and 2. These correlations cannot be used for
transmitting information between 1 and 2. If, in addition, the algebrasA1 andA2
are non-commutative, Bell’s inequalities for correlations between measured values
of observables for 1 and 2, which must be satised under the hypothesis of local
realism, can be shown to be violated. This is, of course, the case in quantum theory.
Under the assumption that there is no instant interaction-at-a-distance between
1 and 2, the (experimentally observed) violation of Bell’s inequalities means that
a realistic interpretation, to the eect that the outcome of measurements on 1 and
2 is predetermined by objective features such as local hidden parameters already
before measurement, is excluded. The indeterminacy of quantum theory is not
epistemic, i.e. due to incomplete knowledge or inevitable perturbations of the state
of the quantum system , but ontic. This fact can and should be interpreted as a
consequence of the holistic character of quantum theory.
Separation and composition are problematic operations in complex systems.
Quite a basic example is the separation given by the epistemic splitting of a phys-
ical system into an observing and an observed subsystem. A quantum theoretical
analysis of the measuring process reveals that the stochastic character of quantum
theory can be attributed to a neglect of holistic correlations between observing and
observed subsystem if the system is in an entangled state. Entangled states of com-
plex systems have a tendency to evolve into decoherent states which are eectively
indistinguishable from an incoherent superposition of separable states.
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4 Weak quantum theory
In this section, we outline some assumptions under which particular features of
quantum theory can be generalized to a framework broader than that of ordinary
quantum theory. For such a framework, we expect the notions of systems, observ-
ables and states to remain valid and meaningful.
A system  is considered as a part of reality in a very general sense, i.e. it can
be the object of attention and investigation beyond the realm of ordinary quantum
theory, possibly even beyond the limitations set by the concept of a material reality.
Even though the isolation of parts of reality is expected to be a problematic opera-
tion, its possibility, at least in some approximate sense, is the prerequisite for any
act of cognition and, in fact, already implicit in the epistemic split between subjects
and objects of cognition.
An observable is any (more or less) meaningful property of the system  which
can be investigated in a given context. Non-trivial observables must exist, whenever
 has enough internal structure to be a possible object of a meaningful study.
To every observable A there should belong a set specA of possible results of an
investigation of A. In the general case addressed in this section, the relation between
A and specA will be dierent from the quantum theoretical situation described in
the previous section.
It must at least be conceivable that the system  exists in dierent states. Dier-
ent states should reflect themselves in dierent outcomes of observations associated
to observables A. Even if the system  de facto always is in the same state z, it
must be possible to conceive it in other states. (Otherwise, nothing could be learned
about .) The possibility of dierent states is indispensible for discussing stability
criteria for the system , which has to maintain its identity under \unsubstantial"
changes.
In addition, the notion of a state also has epistemic aspects, reflecting various
degrees of knowledge about . As in ordinary quantum theory, we call a state pure
if it contains maximal information about . Normally, the state of the system 
will change in the course of time, under the influence of other systems and as a
consequence of being observed and investigated.
As in ordinary quantum theory, we associate a set A of observables and a set Z
of states to every system . Here A and Z are meant to be sets in a naive sense,
not necessary in the sense of axiomatic set theory. Our task will be to investigate
the general structures of A and Z.
The rst property of A we want to formulate is
Axiom I: To every observable A 2 A belongs a set specA, the set of possible
outcomes of a \measurement" of A.
In the previous section we saw that quantum observables can be identied with
functions A : Z ! Z on the set of states. This fact, which underlines the active,
11
operational character of observations, should be valid more generally. We thus for-
mulate
Axiom II: Observables are (identifyable with) mappings A : Z ! Z, which
associate to every state z another state A(z).
Axiom II implies that observables can be composed as maps on Z, where the
map AB is dened by rst applying B and then A. We shall assume
Axiom III: With A and B, also AB is an observable.
A direct consequence of Axiom III is the associativity of the composition of
observables:
A(BC) = (AB)C (23)
Moreover, we can postulate
Axiom IV: There is a unit observable 1l such that 1lA = A1l = A 8 A 2 A.
1l is the operation on Z which does not change any state, it corresponds to a
proposition which is always true, so spec1l = ftrueg. Axioms II{IV mean that the
set of observables has the structure of a monoid, which is also called a semigroup
with unity or an associative magma with unity.
For formal completeness we also need an \impossible" zero state z = o and a zero
observable 0 with spec0 = ffalseg, which corresponds to an always false proposition.
Axiom V: There are a zero state o and a zero observable 0 such that
0(z) = o 8 z 2 Z,
A(o) = o 8 A 2 A, (24)
A0 = 0A = 0 8 A 2 A.
One may wonder about the addition of observables which, after all, plays an im-
portant role in ordinary quantum theory. But even there, the operational denition
of A+B is problematic; for instance there is no general strategy to construct a mea-
suring device for A + B. Nevertheless it should be mentioned that Jordan algebras,
an early attempt to generalize ordinary quantum theory from non-commutative,
associative algebras to commutative, non-associative algebras, are explicitly con-
structed on the basis of an addition of observables (for more details see Primas
1983).
In the generalized framework addressed here, there is no evident place for the
addition of observables. As a consequence, the set of states in weak quantum theory
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cannot be presupposed to be convex as in ordinary quantum theory. This relates to
the fact that a probability interpretation is not feasible within the general framework
of weak quantum theory (but can be implemented by restricting its generality, see
below).
There is no reason to assume commutativity, AB = BA, for all A, B 2 A. Rather
there will be both commutative (compatible) and non-commutative (incompatible)
pairs of observables, depending on whether AB = BA or AB 6= BA. This means
that the monoid structure ofA, however poor and general, contains complementarity
and entanglement as essential features of quantum theory.
A simple model obeying axioms II{IV can be obtained by identifying Z with the
states of a rigid body in space and A with the set of motions. This indicates that
additional structure is required for a reasonable generalization of ordinary quantum
theory. Such additional structure is, indeed, at hand, because there are propositions
P among the observables A which play a distinguished role. A proposition P 6= 0, 1l
is an observable whose outcome is either true or false:
specP = ftrue, falseg for P 6= 0, 1l (25)
Moreover, to every proposition P there must be a negation P , which gives \false"
if and only if P gives \true".
We now give a few rather evident axioms assumed to hold for propositions.
Axiom VIa:
P 2 = P,
P = P, 1l = 0, (26)
PP = PP = 0.
For compatible propositions P1, P2, P1P2 = P2P1 we can dene a conjunction
P1 ^ P2 = P2 ^ P1 = P1P2 (27)
and an adjunction
P1 _ P2 = P 1P 2 = P2 _ P1 (28)
with the properties
P ^ P = P _ P = P,
P1 ^ (P2 ^ P3) = (P1 ^ P2) ^ P3,
P1 _ (P2 _ P3) = (P1 _ P2) _ P3,
P1 ^ (P1 ^ P2) = (P1 ^ P2) ^ P1 = P1 ^ P2,
P1 _ (P1 _ P2) = (P1 _ P2) _ P1 = P1 _ P2, (29)
0 ^ P1 = P1 ^ 0 = 0,
1l ^ P1 = P1 ^ 1l = P1,
0 _ P1 = P1 _ 0 = P1,
1l _ P1 = P1 _ 1l = 1l.
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Moreover, we postulate the meaning of P as verication.
Axiom VIb: If P (z) 6= o, then P (z) is a state in which P is true with certainty.
Finally, we formulate an axiom replacing the spectral theorem of ordinary quan-
tum theory. Every observable A should be equivalent to a set of mutually exclusive
propositions. More precisely, let A be an observable and α 2 specA. Aα denotes the
proposition that the outcome of a measurement of A is α 2 specA. Then we have
Axiom VIc:
AαAβ = AβAα = 0 for α 6= β, AAα = AαA,
∨
α∈specA
Aα = 1l. (30)
A and B are compatible if and only if Aα and Bβ are compatible for all α 2 specA
and β 2 specB.
In general, incompatible observables do not have simultaneous denite values.
Although the generalized weak quantum theory as dened by axioms I{VI is
considerably weaker than ordinary quantum theory, they share the following two
characteristic features.
 Incompatibility and complementarity arise due to the non-commutativity of
the multiplication of observables.
 Holistic correlations and entanglement arise if for a composite system observ-
ables pertaining to the whole system are incompatible with observables of its
parts.
In the latter context, it should be emphasized that weak quantum theory itself
refers to the description of the system as a whole. Any identication of parts or
subsystems implies a specic choice of representation in terms of partial monoids.
This choice remains open in the general framework of weak quantum theory. In
weak quantum theory, the absence of a vector space structure implies that there is
no tensor product construction for the set of observables of a composite system. In
general, we can only expect:
A  A1 A2, Z  Z1  Z2, (31)
A1(Z1)  Z1, A2(Z2)  Z2. (32)
There are other features of weak quantum theory which are not shared by ordi-
nary quantum theory.
 There is no quantity like Planck’ s constant h which in ordinary quantum the-
ory quanties the degree of non-commutativity of two given observables. This
indicates that in the generalized, weak theory, complementarity and entangle-
ment are not restricted to a particular degree of non-commutativity as it is
the case for ordinary quantum mechanics.
14
 Since the addition of observables is not dened in the general framework of
weak quantum theory, there is no convex set of states, there are no linear ex-
pectation value functionals, and there is no probability interpretation. Prob-
ability distributions on the sets specA do not occur and are not calculable in
weak quantum theory. As a matter of fact, the mere concept of probability
will be absent in many situations (e.g., in an exploration of a work of ne art
or of the intensity of an emotion).
 There is no way to generalize Bell’s inequalities up to the general framework
of weak quantum theory, and there is no way to argue that complementarity
and indeterminacy in weak quantum theory are of ontic rather than epistemic
nature. On the contrary, one would expect them to be of rather innocent
epistemic origin in many cases, for instance, due to incomplete knowledge of
the system or uncontrollable perturbations by observation.
Axioms I{VI, characterizing weak quantum theory, can be regarded as minimal
requirements for a meaningful general theory of observables and states of systems.
Between the weak version of quantum theory and its ordinary version, there are
intermediate theories which can be obtained by enriching the axioms stepwise. Let
us rst discuss enrichments of the propositional axiom VI. Subsequently we shall
add a probability interpretation of states.
One evident option is to postulate that the conjunction and adjunction of propo-
sitions is also dened in the less intuitive case of incompatible P1 and P2 such that
propositions P1^P2 and P1_P2 = P 1 ^ P 2 always full the conditions of equations
(29). In addition, it is natural to postulate
P1 ^ (P1 _ P2) = (P1 _ P2) ^ P1 = P1,
P1 _ (P1 ^ P2) = (P1 ^ P2) _ P1 = P1 ^ P2. (33)
The stronger distributivity condition
P1 ^ (P2 _ P3) = (P1 ^ P2) _ (P1 ^ P3),
P1 _ (P2 ^ P3) = (P1 _ P2) ^ (P1 _ P3), (34)
is not even satised in ordinary quantum theory. If every propositional subsystem
generated by two compatible propositions with P1 ^ P2 = P1 and their negations
is Boolean, then (modulo some technical complications) the propositional system is
already isomorphic to a system of orthogonal projectors in a Hilbert space (Piron
1976, Thirring 1981). This Boolean property does not follow from axioms I { VI.
It cannot be prescribed in general which of these additional assumptions are
applicable in a concrete situation. It will be unavoidable to consider details of the
given context for corresponding decisions.
For a probability interpretation of states, one does not loose much by assuming
specA 2 C, because it is very plausible that the set of outcomes of A can be mapped
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into the complex numbers in a one-to-one way. Assuming this, the existence of a
probability interpretation amounts to postulating for every z 6= 0 the existence of
an expectation value functional
Ez : A ! C,
A 7! Ez(A) 2 C, (35)
with
Ez(1l) = 1. (36)
The existence of an expectation value functional has far reaching consequences
 Addition of observables and multiplication of observables with complex num-
bers can now be dened by postulating
Ez(αA + βB) = αEz(A) + βEz(B) (37)
for all Ez. Axioms A1{A10 are fullled, A11 seems to be natural, less so A12.
 Being the mean value of a probability distribution, Ez(A) has to obey reality
and positivity conditions. The only evident way to achieve this is the intro-
duction of a star-involution A ! A∗ with the properties S1{S3. (S2 has to
hold, because A∗A has to be self-adjoint also if A and A∗ do not commute.)
Reality and positivity of Ez mean that Z1 and Z2 have to hold for all Ez.
 The set of all expectation value functionals will be convex. Pure states can be
dened as in ordinary quantum theory.
The axioms B1{B5 are almost mandatory if one assumes that A can be topol-
ogized by a norm. The C∗-axiom C1 is least intuitive. Assuming C1 on top of the
other axioms A, S, B, Z, ordinary quantum theory can be recovered. As mentioned
above, only a detailed analysis of the concrete situation can decide which axioms
are fullled.
5 Complementarity and entanglement in weak
quantum theory: some applications
In this section, we outline three examples for the application of weak quantum
theory. As mentioned in the preceding section, it should be possible to construct
frameworks less restrictive than ordinary quantum theory but more restricitve than
the weak version. Our rst example, the complementarity of dierent types of
dynamical descriptions of physical systems, addresses precisely such a situation.
This example is particularly interesting since it can be presented in a fairly well
formalized manner.
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The second example addresses a complementarity between the eects of placebo
substances and \true" treatment substances in double-blind clinical trials. It is
understood to refer to the eects of such substances in a purely pharmacological
(physiological) sense, i.e., without considering possible psychological aspects. Al-
though this example is backed up by quantitative empirical results, it can (at least
at present) only be discussed at an informal level.
The third example, addressing transference and countertransference phenomena
in psychology, will be discussed in an entirely qualitative and informal way. The basic
complementarity in this example is that of conscious and unconscious processes,
hence the relevant states and observables are mental, not material. It is likely that
this example refers to the minimal set of axioms given in the preceding section.
5.1 Information Dynamics
Generalizing earlier work by Misra (1978) and Misra et al. (1979), an information
theoretical description of chaotic systems (including K-systems) was found to provide
a commutation relation between the Liouville operator L for such systems and a
suitably dened information operator M (Atmanspacher and Scheingraber 1987).
The denition of L is, as usually, given by




where L acts on distributions ρ which represent the states of a system in a usual
probability space (not in a Hilbert space). The continuous spectrum of M derives
from the time-dependent information I(t) which can be gained by measuring par-
ticular properties of a system at time t in comparison with its predicted properties:
M ρ = I(t) ρ = (I(0) + Kt) ρ (39)
K is the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy, a statistical dynamical invariant of the system.
It is experimentally available by Grassberger-Procaccia type algorithms (Grass-
berger and Procaccia 1983). K > 0 only for chaotic systems with intrinsically
unstable dynamics. In an information theoretical interpretation (Shaw 1981), K
characterizes the rate at which the system generates information along its unstable
manifolds. Kt is the information generated by the system between t and t = 0. This
means that the accuracy of a prediction decreases with increasing prediction time.
In simple cases, the commutator of L and M is just given by the rate of infor-
mation generation, namely the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy:
i[L, M ] = K1l (40)
The two operators commmute precisely if the considered system does not generate
information, i.e., if it is intrinsically stable. If K > 0, the dynamical descriptions
due to L and M are dierent with respect to the prediction of a future state of the
17
system. This is a consequence of the increasing uncertainty in predicting the state
of a system as time proceeds. Whenever K > 0, the state ρ(t) of a system cannot
be predicted as accurate as initial conditions have been measured or otherwise xed
at t = 0.
The commutation relation of L and M resembles corresponding commutation
relations in ordinary quantum theory, but there are dierences. First of all, since K
is explicitly system- and parameter-dependent (i.e. highly contextual), the \degree"
of non-commutativity of L and M is not universally the same. This situation is at
variance with conventional quantum mechanics with h as a universal commutator.
Moreover, K is a statistical quantity specifying the average flow of information in
chaotic systems, while h is a non-statistical constant of nature.
As a consequence of relation (40), L and M provide complementary modes of
description. There are two basic features of this complementarity. (i) While L
refers to an ontic, completely deterministic description, M refers to an epistemic,
coarse grained description of explicitly statistical nature (cf. Atmanspacher 2000).
(ii) While a description in terms of L is time-reversal symmetric (reversible), this
symmetry is broken by a description in terms of M , thus leading to irreversibility.
There is an interesting relation between (40) and another commutation relation
between L and a time operator T introduced by Misra (1978) and Misra et al. (1979):
i[L, T ] = 1l (41)
T is well-dened if K > 0. Since L, in addition to its role as an evolution operator
as in (38), can also be interpreted as an energy dierence due to Lρ = [H, ρ], (41)
indicates a complementarity between energy and time for chaotic systems. This
suggests the idea of a temporal entanglement for such systems. This entanglement
can be interpreted as a temporal nonlocality (Misra and Prigogine 1983) due to a
coarse grained phase space; for a more detailed discussion see Atmanspacher (1997).
It should be emphasized that this nonlocality is epistemic and must not be mixed
up with the ontic nonlocality of ordinary quantum theory.
An interpretation of the commutation relation between L and M in terms of
propositions leads to a lattice theoretical analysis. Analogous to the work of Birkho
and von Neumann (1936) which pioneered the non-Boolean logic of quantum theory,
such an analysis provides basic logical features of information processing systems.
Following an idea by Krueger (1984), it was shown that that the temporal evolution
of information processing systems is governed by a non-Boolean logic (Atmanspacher
1991a). More precisely, the propositional lattice characterizing such a logic is com-
plemented but not distributive. The non-distributivity of this lattice, however, shows
a subtle but important dierence as compared with the non-distributivity due to
ordinary quantum theory.
A fundamental feature of lattices as mathematical structures is the duality of
their properties. Formally this means that each true proposition is transformed into
another true propositon by exchanging the dual operations dened in lattice theory.
It turns out that the subtle dierence between the standard quantum theoretical
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non-distributivity and the non-distributivity due to information processing systems
precisely accounts for this duality. While standard quantum theory provides non-
distributivity relations of the form
a > (a ^ b) _ (a ^ b′)
^ b > (b ^ a) _ (b ^ a′) (42)
(a′ ist the complement of proposition a, b′ is the complement of proposition b),
information processing systems satisfy non-distributivity relations of the form:
a < (a _ b) ^ (a _ b′)
_ b < (b _ a) ^ (b _ a′) (43)
By contrast to (42), (43) requires only one of the two inequalities to be satised. A
detailed analysis (Atmanspacher 1991a) shows that this is indeed crucial for the non-
distributivity of information processing systems. It is therefore tempting to consider
the logics of standard quantum systems and of information processing systems as
dual aspects of one underlying non-distributive lattice (Atmanspacher 1991b).
5.2 Placebo Versus Treatment
A prime methodological tool of conventional pharmacological research is the so-
called double-blind, randomized clinical trial (RCT). In such a trial, a test-treatment,
which could be a drug, an operation, or any other medical intervention, is tested
against a control condition, in which all boundary conditions are kept invariant
except the ingredient which is supposed to be the active one. For the sake of sim-
plicity let us concentrate on pharmacological agents in the following example. In
a double-blind trial, then, treatment substance and dummy or placebo substance
are indistinguishable both to treating doctors and patients. Normally, the placebo
substance will be the carrier of the pharmacologically active substance or something
very close to it in appearance and form but with no active pharmacological eect.
Typical placebo substances include substances such as sucrose, lactose, wheat or
corn flour, saline, etc. Generally it is assured that there is no way for the patient
in a trial to know whether they have taken a treatment substance or a placebo sub-
stance. Although a case can be made that in some instances this blinding can be
broken because of specic side eects triggered by the real treatment substance, let
us assume that the blind condition can be maintained.
A clinical trial has to follow rules laid down in regulations ensuring the proper
conduct of such trials, such as the EC note of guidances of \good clinical practice".
A trial is dened by its protocol, which has to be scrutinized by an ethics committee
before commencement of the trial as a legal requirement. This protocol contains
specications of all procedures and denitions used within the trial. It describes
the measurement instruments used, the parameters used for measuring treatment
eects and unwanted side eects. It contains the criteria used to enroll patients or
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to exclude them. The protocol also denes the procedures which are used within the
trial to solicit informed consent of the patients, by describing the written material
used to inform patients, as well as presenting the form which patients have to sign.
The protocol denes the number of encounters between patients and study personnel,
like doctor’s or nurse’s visits, follow-up measurements, or tritration visits used to
adapt the dose. Thus, all vital elements of a trial are dened and described in
advance, and in the case of very complicated and large studies, or studies using
new methodology, are even publicly available in advance by publication of the study
protocol. A RCT can thus be considered as a highly controlled procedure dened
by a detailed protocol.
In its main points, the methodological rationale is a straightforward application
of the guidelines of standard experimental method. All conditions in a RCT are kept
invariant except one, which is selected as related to the active pharmacological agent.
Comparing the experimental results for patients treated with the active agent with
those of a control group without this agent will provide the true pharmacological
eect. The blind condition of RCTs, however, is an ingredient additional to standard
scientic methodology. It is motivated by the fact that any routine of patient care,
measurement of symptoms and administration of substance, no matter what the
pharmacological content is, will have potentially improving eects. Therefore, the
members of the control group and the members of the treatment group are not
informed, i.e., are blind, with respect to whether they receive placebos or treatments.
Since both patients and doctors are blinded as to the content of the medication, from
a subjective point of view everybody receives the same treatment and doctors treat
everybody alike.
It was shown several times that patients in placebo groups of RCTs tend to
improve quite substantially. More precisely, the improvement rate is proportional
to that in the treatment group. This phenomenon was rst described by Evans
(1974) who found that in RCTs concerning pain treatments the response rate of
placebo patients was about 54-56% of that of the treated patients, irrespective of
the reference substance. Thus, placebo patients in a RCT for an opiate, e.g., would
have a higher response rate than placebo patients in a RCT for aspirin, since the
response rate for aspirin treatment is lower than for opiate treatment. Although
these results were recently questioned and explained as artifacts of measurement
(McQuay et al. 1995), there are a number of other reports of the same eect, to
which the arguments of McQuay and colleagues do not apply.
Kirsch and Sapirstein (1999) showed in a meta-analysis of 19 anti-depression drug
trials that the improvement rates with treatment and placebo were correlated by r =
0.90. In other words, placebo patients in RCTs with a high treatment response were
likely to also have a high response rate, and vice versa. While these results could
be caused by the homogeneity of trials { there were only anti-depression trials with
a limited range of substances and patients { high correlations could also be shown
between improvement rates for patients in treatment and placebo groups in dierent
sets of studies. In a meta-analysis comprising 26 studies of a variety of diseases and
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patients (Walach and Maidhof 1999), a correlation of r = 0.68 was found between
improvement with treatment and placebo. In a second meta-analysis of 144 long
term clinical trials with treatments lasting for more than 12 weeks (i.e., mostly for
chronic diseases) with a wide range of diseases and patients, the correlation between
improvement with treatment and placebo was r = 0.78 (Walach et al. 2000).
As McQuay (1995) pointed out, a high correlation between the improvement
rates for placebo and treatment patients in clinical trials is highly disturbing, since
no such correlation would be expected. If there are correlations at all, they should
be very faint and certainly not in the range observed. If correlations of the reported
size exist, these results call for an explanation. Let us try to outline a possible
approach toward such an explanation in terms of the ideas presented in Sec. 4.
A RCT can be considered as a system closed with respect to its environment. It is
prepared by particular rules and actions entailed by those rules, and it continuously
and recursively denes itself. All patients, doctors, and actions of the trial belong
to this system. Patients and doctors, indeed everybody within the entire system, is
blind with respect to the group assignment, as the randomization itself is usually
enacted by a computer algorithm.
In contrast to the global blinded state of the entire system \clinical trial" and the
corresponding global observable preparing the system in this state, there are also
local subsystems due to the actual allocation of a single patient to the treatment
and placebo groups. Each patient has a distinct allocation according to the ran-
domization list, which is unknown to both patient and doctor. In brief, the global
observable of the entire system is the projector providing the blinded state of that
system, whereas the local observable corresponds to the assignment of subsystems,
i.e. individual patients, to either the treatment or the placebo group.
The allocation of a local subsystem and the global fact that the trial is blind
can be considered as complementary with respect to each other. Either a trial is
blind, then allocations must be unknown; or allocations are known, then the trial
is not blind. Consistent with the corresponding incompatibility, the outcomes of
observations depend on their sequence. It makes a dierence whether a blinded
observation is carried out rst or an open one. In this sense, \blinded trial" and
\unique treatment allocation" refer to complementary modes of global and local
descriptions. Since they both describe the same RCT system, it might be speculated
that they constitute a generalized form of entanglement as addressed in Sec. 4.
If such an approach is justied, then the observed correlations between the im-
provement rates of placebo and treatment groups across dierent trials can be inter-
preted as a consequence of entanglement in the generalized sense. In this case the
improvement in the placebo group would be nothing else than a correlative eect
(in general not a causal eect!) of the improvement in the treatment group. In the
global context of a blind RCT, it is illegitimate to speak about a locally allocated
treatment group in contrast to a placebo group. As long as the blinding is active,
the patients do, loosely speaking, neither belong to the treatment group nor to the
placebo group { or, equivalently, they belong to both. The corresponding entangled
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state becomes disentangled when the allocation is uncovered and subsystems with
clear allocation are generated. The former wholeness of the global system is then
reflected by correlations between local subsystems.
5.3 Countertransference Phenomena
Freud (1992) was the rst to observe that in the context of a therapeutic relation-
ship strange interpersonal experiences can happen which he called transference and
countertransference. Transference normally refers to the fact that the patient acti-
vates conflictual relationship themes from his past and enacts them in the context
of the therapeutic relationship, transferring these past experiences into the presence
and acting as if the therapist was his mother, father, brother or whoever he had
the conflictual relationship with. Modern therapeutic theories postulate that a po-
tentially helpful therapy will in fact activate such past experiences in the presence.
By countertransference Freud originally meant that also within the therapist some
potentially conflictual material can be activated by the patient, if the therapist is
prone to the same problematic pattern as the patient.
In addition to the traditional and straigthforward meaning of transference and
countertransference phenomena there is also a more subtle meaning which we will
discuss in the following. It refers to a therapist’s experience of inner states like emo-
tions, ideas, thoughts, inner images, impulses, needs, phantasies, wishes, which are
in fact \transferred" from the patient and reflect the inner state of the patient rather
than that of the therapist. In clinical practice this countertransference phenomenon
is used both diagnostically and interventionally. Diagnostically it can be a source
of direct and intuitive information about the inner world of the patient. Thus, if
a therapist experiences, in an otherwise calm atmosphere with a patient talking
serenely about something pleasant which he or she has experienced, sudden throngs
of aggression or wild phantasies of sexual abuse, then he might tentatively isolate
these inner experiences as possibly belonging to the patient rather than to himself.
He might then operate with the hypothesis that the calm story of the patient is just
the surface, while underneath there might lie some material of a more dire nature.
Depending on the school of therapy the therapist belongs to, the nature of the
problem, the state of the therapy, and the personality of the patient the therapist
might choose to express this phantasy explicitly and oer it to the patient as an
interpretative framework. Alternatively, he might feed back his own inner world,
without any qualications, as is often done in Gestalt therapy. Or he may keep it as
an information which could direct later interventions. In any case, the hypothesis on
which therapists often base their interventions is that the material they experience
themselves under certain circumstances derives from the patient rather than from
themselves. Although it is, strictly speaking, not possible to give clearcut rules as
to when material is transferred or not, there are some practical rules of thumb. If
material feels alien or strange to the therapist’s state of mind, if it does not \t" with
the rest of the situation, then there is a good chance that the material is from the
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patient and not from the therapist himself. Therapeutic training within the depth
psychological schools of therapy places a lot of emphasis and takes great pains and
care to sharpen the inner awareness for the subtle changes which signal transference
processes.
A comparable phenomenon is known from system-therapeutic settings, where
family constellations are enacted in a group. In some schools the person working on
their family will, with the help of the therapist, call other group members onto a
stage or set place. These group members, the so called protagonists, are to take the
place of the family members. Even family members who are long deceased or whom
the patient does not know much about might be included in the family picture. It
has been repeatedly observed that protagonists suddenly experience mental states
which belong to the person exemplied, without the protagonist explicitly knowing
about any corresponding details. For instance a protagonist representing a relative
who has committed suicide, a fact unknown to all persons, might suddenly feel the
impulse to leave the room. Or another protagonist, who represents someone who had
a severe war injury might suddenly complain of strong pain, although nobody in the
room, except perhaps the client, is aware of this fact. System theoretic therapists
call this phenomenon "participatory" or "deputy" perception (Varga v. Kibed 1998).
There are reasons to assume that this is a phenomenon of the same type as in
a classical countertransference situation. In both cases it is supposed that someone
experiences mental states which do not pertain to himself but to someone else, e.g.
the patient or some other person who is represented in the family setting. The
phenomenon is well known as such, but for a lack of theoretical explanation has not
found much interest, except for some practical purposes. We propose here to see
this phenomenon as an example of entangled mental states, a very general situation
addressed by weak quantum theory. The relevant system is either the therapist{
patient system or the family system.
A characteristic feature of therapeutic relationships is mutual openness. Both
the therapist and the client talk freely and openly, without withholding important
or possibly important information. While in the psychoanalytic tradition this is a
crucial part of the explicit therapeutic agreement, it certainly is also implictly true
for most therapeutic alliances. But this openness is opposed by all those parts of
inner material which are not available for conscious processing, either because they
are subconscious and not known, or because they are not identied as having a
particular flavour or relevance. Thus, the local preparation of \conscious openness"
might be considered as complementary to a global preparation of material which is
principally not available, because it is unconscious or irrelevant. While the latter
corresponds to a global observable of the system as a whole (maybe referring to some
kind of collective unconscious material), the former corresponds to local observables
of subsystems, i.e. the consciousness of individuals.
In other words, there is a complementarity of \unconscious blocking" and \con-
scious openness". Material which is unconscious cannot be openly related, and
things which can be talked about openly cannot be unconscious. These two con-
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cepts are complementary, since they are not only opposed to each other, but pre-
clude each other and at the same time are both necessary for a complete picture
of the overall system. If some material is unconscious it cannot at the same time
be openly communicated. Whatever can be openly communicated must not be un-
conscious. The two descriptions satisfy the condition of non-commutativity in the
general sense. Wherever there are suciently closed systems in this sense, which
nevertheless contain unconscious material, an entangled state ensues in which by
virtue of this entanglement the unconscious material may surface locally in other
parts of the system. While this gives a theoretical perspective for what happens in
countertransference situations, this description also entails practical and theoretical
consequences.
One simple examle is the following. If by some sort of \organizational closure"
human beings have founded a new system { a pair of lovers, a family, or another social
group { and if openness is a local descriptor of the system, then any unconscious
material within the system can surface at some particular part of the system. Thus,
if in a marriage relationship one of the partners experiences something which is
systemically \unconscious", say the wish to separate, then this wish can surface
in the one partner’s awareness as his or her own wish. The fatal aspect of such a
phenomenon is that the corresponding material is mostly taken at face value instead
as a possible indicator of something belonging to the other person.
Both transference and countertransference phenomena express particular, com-
plicated relationships between conscious and unconscious domains of the human
psyche. In the extensive dialog between Jung and Pauli, one can nd some specu-
lative ideas addressing this relationships as analogous to basic features of physical
systems. In particular, Pauli indicated that \the epistemological situation concern-
ing the concepts ‘consciousness’ and ‘unconscious’ seems to indicate a far-reaching
analogy to the ... situation within physics. ... From the viewpoint of psychology,
the ‘observed system’ would not only consist of physical objects but also comprise
the unconscious, while the role of the ‘observing system’ would be due to con-
sciousness" (see Jung 1971). This viewpoint oers a complementary relationship
between unconscious and conscious processes which is tightly related to the scheme
discussed above. In the Pauli{Jung framework, the undierentiated unconscious is
the global system, while elements of consciousness, such as mental categories, are
local. Particular mental categories (and their mental environments) are conceived to
be generated by the transformation of elements of the unconscious into consciously
and empirically accessible categories.
6 Summary
The core content of this paper is the formulation of a weak version of quantum
theory. It is motivated by the attempt to nd a formal framework for addressing
the concepts of complementarity and entanglement not only within the context of
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ordinary quantum physics, but also in more general contexts. The weak version of
quantum theory is based on a minimal set of axioms. The basic structure of the
resulting mathematical framework is that of a monoid.
Ordinary quantum theory can be recovered from this framework by additional
axioms, restrictions, and specications. For example, the weak version does not nec-
essarily entail a Hilbert space representation or a probabilistic interpretation. The
non-commutativity of observables is not necessarily quantied by Planck’s constant.
Bell-type inequalities cannot necessarily be formulated in weak quantum theory.
Among the many examples for complementary relations that can be found in the
literature, three individual case studies were presented to demonstrate the applica-
bility of weak quantum theory. They refer to (1) complementary types of dynamical
descriptions of physical systems, (2) unexpected correlations in double-blind studies
of pharmacological substances, and (3) the relation between conscious and uncon-
scious processes in psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic settings.
These examples show that there are dierent levels of generalization between
weak quantum theory and ordinary quantum theory, depending on which restrictions
are added to the minimal, weak framework. While example (3) is likely to need the
full generalization of the weak version, example (2) is somewhat more restrictive by
referring to probabilistic concepts. In example (1) only a few conditions of ordinary
quantum theory are relaxed. These conditions are discussed to some detail.
Dierent future steps to explore the potential of weak quantum theory are con-
ceivable. One of them is a more formal and detailed discussion of applications, which
would go beyond the frame of the present paper. In particular, the question as to
how psychophysical relationships could be treated within weak quantum theory is
of interest in this respect. Needless to say, it will be crucial to propose and carry
out experiments demonstrating the full power of the approach.
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